International Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
Volume 15 · Issue 2 · 2026 · Pages 2137–2149
e-ISSN 2255-1824 (Online) · www.revistaidj.com/IJLJ

Concerning the organisation of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption in Algeria: An analytical study of the principles of transparency and accountability.

Pr. Fouzia Zaamouche[1], Dr. Maya Ouis[2]

[1] Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Constantine 1, Frères Mentouri, Algeria, Email: Fouzia.zaamouche@umc.edu .dz

[2] Lecturer Class A, Faculty of Law, University of Constantine 1, Frères Mentouri, Algeria, Email: maya.ouis@umc.edu.dz

Received: 6 April 2026 | **Accepted:** 7 August 2026 | **Published:** 5 November 2026

Abstract

The new Law No. 22-08, which relates to the fight against financial corruption in Algeria, is of great importance as it embodies the principles of transparency and accountability. This falls within the framework of the Algerian Government's ongoing efforts to consolidate the principles of good governance and establish integrity in the management of public affairs. This is in accordance with the constitutional reforms introduced by the 2020 Constitutional Amendment, which established these two principles as constitutional pillars in building the State of Law and its institutions.

This article therefore aims to evaluate the effectiveness of Law No. 22-08 in achieving its intended objectives in combating financial corruption, based on an analysis of the principles of transparency and accountability. Transparency involves making information and data available to the public in a clear and accurate manner, enabling the performance of public institutions to be monitored and holding them accountable for any shortcomings or deviations. The principle of accountability, in turn, is reflected in the existence of effective oversight mechanisms that ensure officials are held accountable for corrupt practices or abuse of public office.

This research paper therefore seeks to identify and examine the extent to which Law No. 22-08 can ensure the embodiment of these two principles in a manner that allows for the establishment and strengthening of a legal framework that can address financial corruption more effectively and professionally.

Keywords: Combating financial corruption; embodiment of the principle of transparency; mechanisms of the principle of accountability; management of public affairs; good governance.

Introduction:

The process of incorporating constitutional principles into positive laws and legislation is one of the fundamental pillars upon which the rule of law and democratic systems are based. As the supreme law of the country, the Constitution represents the ultimate reference point from which all other legislation derives its legitimacy and binding force. Therefore, such legislation must be consistent with the Constitution's principles and general provisions.

Embracing constitutional principles in legislation is crucial because it reflects the principle of the rule of law and fosters respect for constitutional legitimacy. When laws and legislation adhere to constitutional principles and translate them into practical provisions and mechanisms, they ensure that everyone is subject to the authority of the supreme law, thereby preserving the fundamental principles and values on which the country's legal and political system is based.

In this context, it is evident that there is a need to examine the extent to which the principles of transparency and accountability are embodied in the new Law No. 22-08 relating to the fight against financial corruption, as these principles have been adopted and enshrined in the Algerian legal system. The constitutionalisation of the principles of transparency and accountability in Law No. 22-08 came in response to the growing demands of the Algerian people over recent years. Following the high levels of financial corruption witnessed in Algeria, demands from the Algerian people to combat corruption among officials and hold them accountable were among the most important factors leading to significant political and social transformation in the country.

This qualitative shift in legal regulation could help to address the significant challenges Algeria has faced and continues to face in combating corruption and maintaining integrity in public administration. The law aims to enhance transparency in public administration and institutions, and to strengthen accountability mechanisms. By implementing the principles of transparency and accountability, the law seeks to prevent corruption, rebuild public confidence in Algerian institutions and elected authority, and establish the political and legal responsibility of officials in charge of public funds. This is all within the framework of a modern state that emphasises the rule of law and control over financial corruption.

This research paper aims to examine this qualitative transformation in depth by analysing Law No. 22-08 and assessing its ability to implement transparency and accountability principles in public institutions' practices. It will also identify the challenges

and risks of this legal approach to combating financial corruption.

In light of these legal and constitutional transformations, the following scientific problem may be raised:

- To what extent is Law No. 22-08, relating to the fight against financial corruption in Algeria, effective in translating constitutional principles of transparency and accountability into practical mechanisms that decisively and fairly combat financial corruption, promote good governance and establish integrity in the management of public affairs?

In line with this scientific approach, this research paper is structured into two sections to analyse this issue.

Section One examines the content of the principles of transparency and accountability and their constitutional basis.

The principles of transparency and accountability have become fundamental to the democratic system and good governance. They embody the concept of the rule of law and guarantee the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. They also represent an essential safeguard against corruption and a means of preserving integrity in the management of public affairs.

The Algerian constitutional founders therefore considered the principles of transparency and accountability to be important manifestations that support the development of the Algerian political system and promote democratic standards in the management and administration of public affairs. Constitutional recognition of these two principles established the framework for national legislation, culminating in the promulgation of Law No. 22-08 relating to the fight against financial corruption.

Before addressing their constitutional basis and demonstrating how they have evolved from mere jurisprudential concepts into legal principles enjoying constitutional recognition and protection, it is necessary to determine the meaning of the principles of accountability and transparency by examining their definitions in jurisprudence, which establish the scope of each principle.

The jurisprudential definition of the principles of transparency and accountability

It is important to review the jurisprudential definitions of these principles, given that they each originated in a specific context: the regulation of administrative work to ensure oversight of the performance of public authorities. This is reflected in the various definitions. However, the development of administrative thought, particularly the emergence of the concepts of good governance and the evolution of public administration, has expanded their scope and changed their content. They have therefore ceased to be merely administrative standards, instead taking the form of two fundamental principles associated with ensuring integrity in the exercise of authority and transparency in decision-making and oversight. Therefore, presenting these definitions is important for establishing their jurisprudential meaning and understanding how their content has developed and expanded.

A. Definition of the Principle of Transparency

Scholars and researchers have devoted considerable attention to defining the principle of transparency and establishing its scope. This principle has been approached from several perspectives based on the range of fields with which it is associated. Accordingly, we can present some of the most prominent definitions:

For example, Anne Peters defines transparency as ‘the mere accessibility of information’, making the availability and accessibility of information an essential part of the concept[1].

Christopher Hood, on the other hand, views transparency as part of a broader concept of openness, linking it to the availability of information and ensuring that the rules and procedures governing the exercise of public authority are clear, understandable and predictable[2].

Ali Al-Sheikh considers transparency to mean complete clarity in decision-making and policymaking processes, and in the clarity of laws, performance monitoring and accountability. This definition reveals the broad scope of transparency, encompassing not only the availability of information, but also clarity in decision-making and policymaking processes, and the clarity of laws. It also encompasses the possibility of monitoring performance and holding officials accountable[3].

As for Atiya Hussein Afandi, he believes that transparency requires the government and public administrative bodies to be clear and open about their activities, tasks and programmes, and how they exercise their powers and conduct their relations, so that the public can see what they are doing. He illustrates this with the following expression: ‘The government and public administrative bodies should be in a glass box[4].’

He defines transparency as “a set of fundamental activities or practices characterised by clarity and the continuous flow of information, to which individuals are entitled, and which should be made available to beneficiaries in a timely and appropriate manner, avoiding ambiguity and confusion”[5].

‘Every individual has the right to access and obtain information on policymaking mechanisms and institutional decision-making, whether they are an employee or a citizen dealing with an institution. Transparency constitutes an approach to establishing ethical standards and an institutional code of conduct, given that it leads to trust and helps to detect corruption[6].’

It has also been defined as follows: ‘The administration operating in a glass house where everything is exposed to employees and the public.’ This includes the systems through which the administration operates, as well as the means necessary to ensure that everyone is aware of and knowledgeable about the reality of its activities and work, through disclosure, publicity and clarity. This enables the administration to be questioned and held accountable[7].’

Transparency International, a leading international non-governmental organisation in the field of anti-corruption work, defined transparency in its 2009 report, International Transparency Principles for Government Institutions, as follows: ‘Transparency is

the characteristic that makes government rules, regulations and decisions open to public scrutiny and consideration by interested parties. It also includes providing sufficient and appropriate information to all relevant parties. For citizens, transparency means that information is open, understandable, and subject to oversight"[8].

The right of access to public information is the first step towards achieving openness in public administration and is central to the principle of financial transparency. The legal protection of this right enables individuals to access various administrative departments and obtain information relating to public affairs, providing them with the opportunity to participate equally in decision-making within public administration. Thus, the right of access to information plays a vital role in conferring legitimacy and democracy upon administrative work. The importance of the right of access to information is not limited to this aspect, however. It is also considered an important tool for citizens to oversee the work of public administration. With legal protection for this right, the activities of public administration can be subject to close public scrutiny, preventing the abuse of entrusted authority and, consequently, corruption[9].

Based on this definition, transparency is a legitimate principle that requires public authorities to fully and explicitly disclose information relating to their activities and decisions, without concealment, misrepresentation or misleading information, whether relating to financial transactions or otherwise. Such information must be regularly made available to citizens and the public in accordance with the applicable legislation's rules and procedures. The aim is to achieve justice, integrity and accountability, protect the rights of those involved and safeguard public and private interests.

B. Definition of the Principle of Accountability

Given its connection with the exercise of public authority, the oversight of its activities, and ensuring that it is subject to accountability, jurisprudence has also devoted attention to defining the principle of accountability and determining its content from different perspectives. The most prominent jurisprudential definitions are as follows:

Accountability means: 'The extent to which an individual assumes responsibility for the tasks assigned to them and the duties arising therefrom, in accordance with the conditions and specifications previously agreed upon[10].'

Joseph Jabra defined accountability as: 'An expression of individuals' responsibility for the actions they commit.' Similarly, a public service institution is responsible for behaviours and actions resulting from job performance.

John Carver considers accountability to be an accumulated responsibility. This means that every individual within an administrative organisation is responsible for their own actions, and the higher levels are responsible for their own actions, as well as those of the lower levels. This means that officials within the administrative apparatus bear two types of responsibility. One type is an accumulated responsibility that extends from the bottom upwards, whereby every manager is accountable for their personal conduct and the actions of their team[11].

Mark Bovens defines accountability as a relationship between an individual or group and an oversight body. In this relationship, the individual or group is required to explain and justify their conduct, while the oversight body has the right to ask questions and issue judgements that may result in consequences or sanctions[12].

Andreas Schedler considers accountability to be based on requiring those in power to provide information about their actions and decisions, and to explain and justify them. There must also be the possibility of subjecting them to sanctions in cases of misconduct. Accordingly, accountability is based on two fundamental dimensions: answerability and enforcement or sanction[13].

'Accountability' refers to holding subordinates accountable for the results they achieve through performing their official duties. It takes place when relationships exist between positions at different administrative levels, whereby an individual or level is responsible to another administrative level for their conduct and performance of the tasks entrusted to them[14].'

Based on the above jurisprudential definitions, accountability can be defined as the legal and ethical obligation of public employees and officials within various state bodies to be subject to oversight and inspection by competent authorities, and to bear legal responsibility for any abuses or violations committed in the course of performing their official duties, at civil or criminal level.

Accountability comprises several fundamental elements:

- Transparency: This means making information and procedures clear and accessible for examination.
- Independence: The oversight body is independent of the entity it is holding accountable.
- Standards: The existence of specific standards and criteria that govern work and serve as points of reference.
- Accountability and sanction: The possibility of holding the accountable entity to account and punishing it in the event of a violation.
- Participation: Involving the relevant parties in the accountability process.

2. The constitutional foundations of the principles of transparency and accountability

Examining the jurisprudential definitions of transparency and accountability reveals the importance of examining their constitutional foundations. This allows us to determine how constitutional enshrinement has shaped these definitions, and whether this was done explicitly or implicitly through constitutional provisions relating to these principles. In other words, did the constitutional framers choose to enshrine these principles at the same level?

A. The Constitutional Basis of the Principle of Transparency

The successive constitutional amendments of 2016 and 2020 included several provisions that constitute a legal framework and direct recognition of the principle of transparency. This provides a constitutional basis for guaranteeing citizens' right to access and obtain information.

The 2016 Constitutional Amendment established various manifestations and indicators intended to embody transparency in public administration. Through this amendment, the constitutional founder made a significant legal breakthrough in the process of constitutional amendments by adopting the right of access to information under Article 51, which states:

'Access to information, documents and statistics, as well as their transmission, is guaranteed to citizens. The exercise of this right may not infringe upon the private life of others, their rights, the legitimate interests of institutions, or the requirements of national security."[15] The law shall determine the procedures for exercising this right"[15].

An analysis of the wording of the above-mentioned constitutional provision indicates that the constitutional recognition of the right of access to information was comprehensive and firmly established, owing to the terminology adopted by the constitutional founder, which carries significant implications. The expressions "obtaining" and "transmitting" go beyond the mere concept of the right to consult information on-site; rather, they indicate the right to acquire information and the entitlement to circulate it.

It should also be noted that the right of access to information is merely one mechanism of transparency, and consequently the concept of transparency itself had not yet been established. The only exception was the provision in the same amendment regarding the electoral process in Article 193, which stipulates: 'The public authorities responsible for organising elections are required to ensure their transparency and impartiality.' The constitutional founder also guaranteed transparency in the management of public funds by entrusting this role to the Court of Accounts[16].

The latest Constitutional Amendment of 2020 saw a qualitative development, with provisions demonstrating a stronger commitment to establishing the principle of transparency in the management of public affairs emerging.

Several guarantees were established to protect public funds and combat corruption. Some of these were provisions that had already been enshrined and were subsequently amended, while others took the form of new provisions and foundations not included in previous constitutions. These guarantees were first embodied in the Preamble to the Constitutional Amendment through Paragraph Thirteen, which was enshrined for the first time, emphasising that: 'Algeria expresses its commitment to working towards the prevention and fight against corruption, in accordance with the international conventions it has ratified'. This paragraph establishes a new constitutional basis not included in previous constitutions[17].

New provisions were introduced to Article 9 of the Constitutional Amendment to emphasise that people should choose institutions whose purpose is to guarantee transparency in the management of public affairs and to protect the national economy from manipulation, embezzlement, bribery, illicit trade, abuse of power, unlawful appropriation, illegal confiscation and money smuggling[18].

Furthermore, this constitutional amendment explicitly recognised the principle of transparency, elevating it from a general principle to an institutionally enshrined one. The most prominent provisions in this regard are Articles 204 and 205. Article 204 enshrines transparency in the constitution by establishing an independent constitutional body responsible for promoting transparency: the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption. Article 205 defines the constitutional functions and responsibilities associated with the principle of transparency. The first paragraph expressly stipulates the preparation of the national transparency strategy, ensuring its implementation and monitoring. The following three paragraphs provide for the collection, processing and communication of information, making it available to competent bodies, and for the monitoring and implementation of the promotion of a culture of transparency, the moralisation of public life, and the strengthening of the principles of transparency and good governance.

It is clear, therefore, that Articles 204 and 205 provide the explicit constitutional basis for the principle of transparency. Article 204 elevates the principle of transparency, transforming it from an administrative standard for implementing public policy into a constitutionally protected and consolidated institutional framework. Rather than merely referring to the principle of transparency, the legislator granted it a place at the very heart of the constitutional structure by establishing an independent constitutional authority known as the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption.

Article 205 builds on this by defining the powers associated with transparency. It provides for the establishment of a national transparency strategy and the circulation of information to competent bodies, as well as the promotion and strengthening of a culture of transparency within the framework of good governance.

Therefore, we can argue that these constitutional provisions are consistent with the previously discussed jurisprudential definition of the principle of transparency, which is based on the availability of information and the possibility of accessing and overseeing such information. Article 205 incorporates these elements, particularly in its final three paragraphs, which address the collection, processing and communication of information, and its availability to competent bodies.

B. The constitutional basis of the principle of accountability

The concepts of transparency and accountability are interrelated, with each one reinforcing the other. Without accountability, transparency would have no value. The existence of both principles contributes to the establishment of an efficient and effective administration that fulfils its role in providing citizens with the required services. Transparency provides the fundamental

conditions and requirements for establishing effective accountability systems that can find appropriate solutions to the many problems facing government administration and enhance its capacity to address challenges. Conversely, accountability systems characterised by efficiency and effectiveness strengthen the concept of transparency through the mechanisms and elements they encompass[19].

Unlike the principle of transparency, the constitutional legislator did not refer directly to the principle of accountability in the constitutional text itself. Instead, it established its foundations indirectly through several constitutional provisions, each focusing on one of the elements of accountability.

In this regard, Article 24 provides as follows:

‘The creation of any public position or the undertaking of any public procurement that does not serve the public interest is prohibited.

Positions and mandates within state institutions may not be used to enrich oneself or serve private interests. Every public official must avoid any situation involving a conflict of interest in the exercise of their duties.

Anyone appointed to a senior position in the state, or elected to parliament or a national body, or to a local council, must declare their assets at the beginning and end of their term of office.”

This article imposes restrictions and obligations on public officeholders, making them subject to verification of their performance of public functions. Declaring assets is also a means of verification and oversight, and therefore represents one of its manifestations.

As for Article 25, which stipulates that: ‘The law shall punish the abuse of influence and the arbitrary exercise of authority’, it focuses on establishing legal consequences when liability arises, and on imposing penalties when abuse of influence or arbitrary exercise of authority is proven. Responsibility and punishment are important components of accountability.

Article 26 establishes the principle of justification by stipulating that: ‘The law shall guarantee the impartiality of the administration. The administration shall be required to provide a reasoned response within a reasonable timeframe to requests requiring the issuance of an administrative decision. The administration shall treat the public impartially, in accordance with the principle of legality, and provide services without delay.’

This provision requires the administration to provide reasons for an administrative decision within a reasonable period. This makes the exercise of authority subject to examination and review in accordance with the principles of legality and impartiality.

Article 199 emphasises financial oversight by stipulating that:

‘The Court of Accounts is an independent supreme institution responsible for overseeing public property and funds. It conducts ex-post audits of the funds of the State, local authorities and public services, as well as State-owned commercial capital. The Court of Accounts promotes good governance and transparency in the management of public funds and the submission of accounts. The President of the Republic appoints the President of the Court of Accounts for a five-year term, renewable once. The Court of Accounts prepares an annual report, which it submits to the President of the Republic, and the President of the Court is responsible for publishing it.’

This article constitutes a constitutional provision that establishes the foundations of accountability in financial and administrative terms, particularly through the adoption of ex-post oversight of public fund management, linking it to account submissions and investigations, and the preparation of an annual report to be submitted to the highest authority in the state.

While Article 204 of the 2020 Constitutional Amendment established the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption, representing an important step towards strengthening this authority’s role in combating corruption, the National Authority for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption was previously established pursuant to Article 202 of the 2016 Constitutional Amendment[20].

An examination of Article 205 of the 2020 Constitutional Amendment reveals that it assigns specific accountability-related tasks to the High Authority, as highlighted in the second and third paragraphs.

Collecting, processing and communicating information related to its field of competence, and making this information available to the relevant bodies.

Referring matters to the Court of Accounts and the relevant judicial authority when violations are identified, and issuing orders to the relevant institutions and bodies when necessary.

Notably, the constitutional text granted the High Authority the power to issue orders within a specific scope and to refer matters to the judicial authority whenever violations are identified. In other words, although it does not have the capacity to exercise a deterrent and punitive role, the Constitution considers it an authority like the other authorities, despite its classification among the oversight institutions.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the aforementioned constitutional provisions reveal a relationship with the content of the jurisprudential definition of the principle of accountability, as the fundamental elements constituting this principle intersect with the definition’s content. Both encompass oversight, verification, requests for explanation and justification, the assumption of responsibility, and the possibility of imposing sanctions. While these provisions do not explicitly stipulate the principle of accountability, collectively they embody its various elements.

Section Two: The Legal Enshrinement of the Principles of Transparency and Accountability

Following the enshrinement of the principles of transparency and accountability in the latest constitutional amendment, which provided substantial support for combating corruption and implementing these principles across all administrative and governmental fields, Law No. 22-08 was promulgated as part of the ongoing legal and institutional framework for preventing and combating corruption. To this end, the Algerian legislator established fundamental legislative rules to strengthen the organisational structure of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption, thereby consolidating these two constitutional principles within its legal provisions.

Legal instruments were also established to govern the practical application and exercise of these two principles. These instruments consist of legislative powers of a preventive nature, as well as powers relating to oversight and verification.

1. Preventive Powers for Enshrining the Principle of Transparency under Law No. 22-08

In Law No. 22-08, the Algerian legislator adopted a set of provisions establishing preventive powers. These took the form of duties and roles assigned to the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption. These powers support the promotion of the principle of transparency and include monitoring compliance with transparency rules and detecting violations.

A. Powers with a rights-based dimension for promoting the principle of transparency

Article 4, paragraph 1, of Law No. 22-08 stipulates:

‘Publishing any information and recommendations that may assist public administrations and any natural or legal person in preventing and detecting acts of corruption.’

This provision grants individuals and institutions the right to access information and participate in the monitoring of public authorities. These rights-based powers enable individuals to exercise specific rights independently of assistance from or negotiation with public bodies.

In other words, the right of access to information enables individuals and entities to access information made available by administrative bodies. This means that the right to obtain information is guaranteed and does not require the approval of public authorities. At the same time, individuals and institutions may request information from public authorities. Their role is therefore not limited to obtaining information that is already available — they may also submit requests for specific information.

The provisions of Article 4 are consistent with, and complement, two constitutional amendments: first, Article 55(1) of the latest amendment, which states that ‘every citizen shall enjoy the right to access, obtain and circulate information, documents and statistics’; and second, Article 205 of the 2020 amendment, which assigns the Higher Authority for Transparency the responsibility to ‘collect, process and communicate information relating to its area of competence and make it available to the relevant bodies’. The powers of the Higher Authority for Transparency in the field of information are therefore not merely technical or administrative instruments, but are connected to an inherent constitutional right: the right of citizens to access information. This illustrates the relationship between the constitutional rights dimension — the citizen’s right to access information — and the institutional dimension of the principle of transparency, as represented by the Higher Authority’s role in collecting, processing and communicating information to the relevant bodies.

It could be argued that Article 04 conferred a rights-based prerogative upon citizens, since the legislature did not restrict information to the authorities or treat it merely as an internal tool for exercising oversight. Instead, it expressly linked the collection and dissemination of information to the assistance of public administrations, as well as natural and legal persons, in the prevention and combating of corruption. Accordingly, transparency becomes a means of enabling those concerned to access information relating to public affairs and contribute to the oversight of corruption.

However, in order to classify the right of access to information as one of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the constitutional amendment, it must be surrounded by a set of effective safeguards to protect those who hold that right. The Algerian legal system is weak in its protection of this right, as it still lacks an independent, specialised institutional mechanism to protect it. Some countries have established authorities with exclusive jurisdiction to promote this right; examples include the Commission for Access to Administrative Documents in the French system, the Information Commissioner in the British system and the Access to Information Authority in the Tunisian system[21].

B. Participatory Powers Supporting the Principle of Transparency

Article 6 of Law No. 22-08 states that ‘any natural or legal person in possession of information, data or evidence relating to acts of corruption must inform the High Authority in writing and sign the letter or complaint, which must contain details of the acts of corruption and sufficient information to identify the person reporting or lodging the complaint’. The complainant or whistleblower shall be protected in accordance with the legislation in force”.

Article 6, which concerns reporting and notification, involves both citizens and civil society. The national legislature has not only enabled individuals and civil society to receive information, but also to convey information relating to acts of corruption to the High Authority. In this context, transparency therefore operates in two directions: the authorities are required to make information available, and individuals are empowered to contribute to the production and circulation

of oversight-related information as social partners.

The success of any project involving change, reform, comprehensive and sustainable development and progress requires the joint efforts of all individuals, groups and organisations in society, irrespective of their political, economic, social or developmental affiliations, views or interests. It also requires their effective and genuine participation through civil society institutions[22].

This prompted the legislature to grant civil society representatives permanent membership of the High Authority for Transparency's highest body, the Council of the High Authority. According to the final paragraph of Article 23, the Council, which is chaired by the President of the High Authority, comprises 12 members, distributed as follows: 'Three civil society figures selected by the President of the National Observatory of Civil Society from among individuals known for their interest in issues relating to the prevention of and fight against corruption'. Civil society representatives on this body are entitled to vote and participate in formulating and discussing the national strategic policy on transparency, as well as approving the annual report.

Additionally, Article 4(5) provides for 'the establishment of an interactive network aimed at involving civil society and coordinating and promoting its activities in the field of transparency and the prevention of, and fight against, corruption'.

This interactive network is thus regarded as a tool for developing participation and social oversight in the fight against corruption, since prevention is better than cure[23].

The overarching purpose of the Algerian 'Narakom' network is to provide an integrated, participatory space for the implementation and monitoring of the national anti-corruption strategy. It achieves this by providing a secure digital environment that supports civil society and enables its members to exchange expertise, experience, knowledge and information. The network also provides a framework for giving testimony and reporting corruption. The network's objectives include 'providing and managing a secure digital space that enables the publication of articles and research relating to the prevention of and fight against corruption, and provides access to specialised information and documents'[24].

The High Authority for Transparency, the Prevention of and Fight Against Corruption is entitled to express its opinion on draft laws submitted by the government and bills introduced by members of parliament, provided they fall within its sphere of competence. However, this does not apply to regulatory instruments. Article 205(6) of the Constitutional Amendment explicitly states that the High Authority's functions include 'expressing opinions on legal texts relating to its sphere of competence'. The advisory opinion issued by the High Authority is not binding on either the government or parliament. They may accept it given that it is issued by the constitutionally competent body responsible for preventing and combating corruption, or reject it for objective reasons or otherwise[25].

During its eighty-fifth session (24 February–4 April 2025), the United Nations Human Rights Council noted a gradual shift in Algeria towards the entrenchment of legal principles and the establishment of practical integrity and accountability mechanisms in connection with the Special Rapporteur's report on the situation of human rights defenders. However, further efforts are needed to strengthen these mechanisms, particularly with regard to the protection of whistleblowers. During her visit to Algeria, the United Nations Special Rapporteur expressly noted that a mechanism had been established under the auspices of the High Authority for Transparency, the Prevention of and Fight Against Corruption, pursuant to Article 6 of Law No. 22-08 of 5 May 2022, to protect whistleblowers. This mechanism enables the Authority to receive notifications or complaints concerning corruption cases. Nevertheless, the scope of its protection remains limited: the whistleblower must be known and identifiable, and the legislation contains no provision setting out specific, clearly defined protection measures. Furthermore, the human rights defenders whom the Special Rapporteur met were either unaware of the mechanism or lacked sufficient confidence in it to feel protected by it[26].

2. Strengthening the principle of accountability under Law No. 22-08

The national legislature has also granted itself the power to activate and reinforce the principle of accountability. The legislation provides for the creation of oversight mechanisms that contribute to the prevention of corruption by issuing formal notices and recommendations to relevant entities. The High Authority for Transparency has been established as an independent, non-judicial authority with powers of inquiry and investigation. It is responsible for ensuring the impartiality of investigations and strengthening efforts to combat corruption.

A. Oversight Authority

Article 7 provides that: 'The High Authority shall monitor the extent to which public administrations, local authorities, public institutions, economic entities, associations and other institutions comply with transparency and anti-corruption systems.'

This empowers the High Authority for Transparency to monitor compliance with transparency systems and systems for the prevention of and fight against corruption in public administrations, local authorities, public institutions, economic entities, associations, and other institutions. Accordingly, the High Authority's role is not limited to establishing or proposing preventive rules, but also extends to verifying and determining whether the aforementioned entities comply with and observe these rules. The entities concerned must demonstrate the extent to which they comply with the legal standards governing transparency and the prevention of corruption.

Article 7 thus grants the High Authority 'powers of oversight and monitoring'. This monitoring covers the extent to which public administrations, local authorities and other bodies comply with transparency systems and anti-corruption measures. The

researcher goes on to note that these systems serve as a benchmark for oversight, making it more specific and directly linked to a pre-established legal standard[27].

By contrast, Article 8 focuses on another aspect, stipulating that monitoring must be subject to an assessment of quality and effectiveness. It states: 'The monitoring provided for in Article 7 of this Law shall include verifying the existence of systems for transparency and the prevention of, and fight against, corruption, as well as assessing their quality, effectiveness, and appropriateness of implementation. The recommendations issued by the High Authority in this regard are intended to assist in establishing appropriate measures and procedures for each entity or institution concerned.'

Article 8 explains and analyses the monitoring set out in Article 7. It states that monitoring involves more than just verifying the existence of transparency and corruption prevention systems. It also involves assessing the quality, effectiveness and appropriateness of their implementation. The recommendations issued by the High Authority in this regard are intended to help the relevant bodies and institutions establish appropriate measures and procedures.

Accordingly, the High Authority's new powers extend beyond monitoring, conferring upon it a 'dynamic oversight function'. This reflects the legislature's shift from a national advisory body to a body vested with practical powers. The researcher also links these powers to oversight, monitoring and implementation[28].

The four paragraphs of Article 9 set out the consequences of deficiencies in the exercise of oversight. They provide the clearest expression of the principle of accountability in cases of non-compliance or failure to ensure the quality and effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. The article states:

'Where the High Authority finds, either on its own initiative or following a report or notification, that the quality and effectiveness of the measures applied within public bodies, administrations, associations and institutions for the prevention and detection of corruption have been compromised, it shall issue recommendations aimed at bringing such violations to an end within the specified timeframe.'

The institutions and bodies concerned shall submit a report to the High Authority on the extent to which they have complied with these recommendations. In the event of no response or an inadequate response, …'

*The Arabic text provided ends mid-sentence.

The High Authority shall issue an order to the relevant institution or body, requiring them to implement the recommendations within a period of no more than one year. If the order is not complied with, the High Authority shall notify the competent bodies designated by regulation so that they may take appropriate measures.

The High Authority intervenes when it identifies a breach affecting the quality and effectiveness of measures for preventing and detecting acts of corruption. It issues recommendations to the relevant bodies, administrations, associations and institutions, requiring them to take appropriate measures to put an end to such breaches and setting a deadline for doing so. Additionally, the public authority for transparency must submit a detailed report to the High Authority on the results of implementing the recommendations. If there is no response, or if the response is inadequate, the High Authority may issue an order requiring the relevant body to implement the recommendations within a period not exceeding one year. If this order is not complied with, the High Authority shall notify the relevant bodies.

The High Authority issues recommendations to bodies that fail to comply with transparency rules and is empowered to order those bodies to comply with the recommendations within one year. This constitutes a clear oversight and monitoring mechanism, grounded in transparency and the prevention of corruption, and subject to a defined timeframe for procedures — features that were absent from the National Authority for the Prevention of and Fight Against Corruption[29].

Accordingly, the Algerian legislature has devoted considerable attention to the principle of accountability, structuring it around monitoring and oversight. The process begins with monitoring whether entities are subject to transparency systems, moves on to assessing the effectiveness of these systems and how well they are implemented, and ends with monitoring implementation and ensuring compliance.

However, the legislature did not confine itself to this institutional framework, also developing practical tools for assessing integrity within Algerian institutions. One such tool is the Integrity and Transparency Index (IPI NAZAHA), which was introduced during an exchange of knowledge and experiences regarding countries' anti-corruption policies, drawing on lessons learned from Korea.

On this occasion, Mr Ezzedine Gawa, Secretary-General of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and Fight Against Corruption (HATPLC), presented updates on the Integrity and Transparency Index, 'NAZAHA' (IPI NAZAHA). The scope of the index has expanded from 16 targeted institutions to 22 public institutions, including local authorities. Mr Gawa highlighted various dimensions of Algeria's approach, which encourages institutions to participate voluntarily and provides incentives and recognition for high-performing bodies. He also emphasised the clear articulation of the tool's objectives through guidance manuals, alongside activities aimed at building and developing institutional capacities. Furthermore, he outlined the High Authority's plans to extend the application of the 'NAZAHA' Index to the private business sector in the future. He expressed optimism that this would produce tangible results based on recent dialogues and meetings held with various stakeholders and relevant actors in Algeria[30].

B. Authority to Conduct Inquiries and Investigations

The legislature vested the Supreme Authority with the power to conduct inquiries and investigations on the basis that it is independent of the judicial authority at the preliminary investigation stage. This guarantees the impartiality of the investigation and protects it from any pressure or interference.

Assigning members of the Supreme Authority to conduct inquiries and investigations also reflects their training and expertise in tackling corruption offences. Furthermore, dividing the workload and responsibilities between the judicial authority and the Supreme Authority helps to ensure the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts without placing an additional burden on the judicial authority.

Accordingly, Article 5 provides:

'The Supreme Authority shall conduct administrative and financial inquiries into signs of illicit enrichment involving a public official who is unable to justify a significant increase in their assets. The inquiries conducted by the Supreme Authority may extend to any person suspected of concealing the unjustified wealth of a public official, where it is established that the latter is its beneficial owner within the meaning of the legislation in force".

Under this provision, the legislature has assigned the Supreme Authority the task of investigating and inquiring into the illicit enrichment of public officials who are unable to explain a substantial increase in their assets. The scope of the inquiry has also been broadened to include any person involved in concealing such wealth, as this measure aims to address administrative and financial corruption in public bodies and institutions.

This means that the Supreme Authority is authorised to carry out administrative and financial investigations in order to identify cases of illicit enrichment among public officials. This power may also be exercised against individuals involved in concealing illicit wealth[31].

Where there is serious evidence indicating that a public official has been illicitly enriched, the Supreme Authority may submit a report to the Public Prosecutor at the Sidi M'hamed Court. The aim is to obtain precautionary measures to freeze banking transactions or assets for a period of three months. These measures are imposed by a judicial order issued by the President of the Court, as set out in Article 11.

Article 17 states that 'the Authority shall be equipped with a specialised body for administrative and financial investigations into illicit enrichment'. This establishes a specialised institutional framework by equipping the Supreme Authority with a body dedicated to investigating the illicit enrichment of public officials. This differs from Article 5, which grants the Supreme Authority substantive jurisdiction to conduct such inquiries.

In other words, the legislature not only conferred general investigative and inquiry powers on the Supreme Authority, but also established a specialised body within it. This transformed the inquiry function from a mere legal power into a permanent institutional framework for accountability. This task has been assigned to personnel who have received training and gained expertise in investigations and financial inquiries. This enables them to monitor financial circumstances and compare increases in assets with their lawful sources. This constitutes an additional measure that strengthens the role of the Supreme Authority.

The 2023 annual report of the Supreme Authority addressed the powers of the specialised body. Article 8 of Presidential Decree No. 23-234 of 27 June 2023 defines the structures of the Supreme Authority for Transparency and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption and sets out the powers of the body responsible for administrative and financial investigations into the illicit enrichment of public officials. This body comprises two directorates and four sub-directorates. Its principal powers include:[32]

- conducting investigations and gathering evidence in cases involving the illicit enrichment of public officials;

- coordinating with other specialised bodies in the field of investigation;

- proposing to the President of the Supreme Authority any measure to ensure the proper conduct of investigations carried out by the specialised body;

- preparing reports and submitting them to the President of the Supreme Authority for the purpose of obtaining precautionary measures from the head of the judicial authority.

- preparing reports and submitting them to the President of the Supreme Authority in order to obtain precautionary measures from the head of the judicial authority.

Clearly, the duties assigned to the specialised body under Article 8 do not make it merely an entity that receives information or suspicions of corruption. Rather, it is an instrument for actively verifying such information by conducting investigations and gathering all relevant evidence and information. Coordination with other specialised bodies is also necessary to ensure the effectiveness of these efforts, as well as the exchange of information and expertise.

Preparing draft reports and submitting them to the President of the Supreme Authority provides a link between the investigative work and its resulting legal consequences. This enables the facts to be documented and referred to the relevant legal authorities, who can then take the necessary legal measures. This is reflected in Article 22, paragraph 9, which states: 'The President of the Supreme Authority shall be its legal representative and, in that capacity, shall exercise the following powers:'

'Referral of files containing facts that may be legally characterised as criminal offences to the territorially competent Public Prosecutor, and of those that may constitute management irregularities to the President of the Court of Accounts.'

As the legal representative of the Supreme Authority, the President is empowered by this provision to refer files concerning criminal offences to the Public Prosecutor and files concerning management irregularities to the President of the Court of Accounts. This brings the process of inquiry and investigation to completion.

The Supreme Authority for Transparency and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption thus serves as an active instrument for preventing and combating corruption. It now issues formal notices and warnings, and refers files involving criminal conduct directly to the Public Prosecutor's Office without first referring them to the Minister of Justice, as was previously the case under the remit of the National Body[33].

Conclusion:

The study of the principles of transparency and accountability under Law No. 22-08 on the Supreme Authority for Transparency and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption has shown that, through the 2020 constitutional amendment and the aforementioned law, the Algerian legislator progressed from merely affirming general anti-corruption principles to establishing legal and institutional mechanisms to enforce them. The analysis of constitutional and legislative provisions, together with an examination of the Supreme Authority's institutional practices, reveals the following findings:

- The 2020 constitutional amendment established the principles of transparency and accountability as a constitutional basis and framework for exercising oversight and promoting transparency. Law No. 22-08 translated these principles into legal powers, competencies, and an institutional structure, as reflected in Article 55 concerning the right of access to information and Article 205 providing for the establishment of the Supreme Authority for Transparency and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption.
- The analysis shows that the legislator did not establish transparency and accountability as separate principles. Instead, they are based on a complementary relationship: the availability and disclosure of information, together with communication, are important for identifying abuses and irregularities. Meanwhile, oversight, investigation and referral mechanisms ensure that those responsible for such violations are held accountable. The legislator thus demonstrated the connection between, and importance of, the two principles: transparency serves as a preparatory means for applying accountability, while accountability embodies the outcomes of applying the principle of transparency.
- The principle of accountability is embodied in oversight and follow-up powers, as set out clearly in Articles 7, 8 and 9 of Law No. 22-08. Article 7 establishes the principle of monitoring compliance with the transparency system and the prevention and combating of corruption by the relevant bodies and administrations. Article 8 extends this monitoring to include verifying the existence, quality and effectiveness of these systems, as well as the appropriateness of their implementation. Article 9, in turn, addresses the outcomes of the oversight process by providing for the issuance of recommendations and monitoring their implementation. It also provides for the issuance of a compliance order where a response is not provided or is inadequate.
- The same law also granted the Authority the power to conduct administrative and financial investigations into the illicit enrichment of public officials under Article 5. This power was reinforced by Article 17, which established a specialised body for such investigations. According to Article 22, the findings of these investigations empower the President of the Supreme Authority to refer files containing facts that may constitute criminal offences to the territorially competent Public Prosecutor and files containing facts that may constitute management irregularities to the President of the Court of Accounts. This is the final manifestation of the principle of accountability adopted by the law.
- The results reported by the Supreme Authority regarding the receipt of notifications, the examination of corruption-related files and the referral of some of these files to the relevant authorities, demonstrate that the powers granted by Law No. 22-08 are having a tangible impact. However, these results alone do not prove that the law has been successful in tackling corruption. The accountability principle's effectiveness must still be assessed in light of the outcomes of the referred cases and how seriously recommendations and orders are implemented.

Accordingly, the implementation of the mandate to combat administrative and financial corruption has revealed ongoing challenges in establishing the principles of transparency and accountability within the legal framework, particularly in practice. This is particularly significant given the high levels of financial corruption that affected the management of public affairs in previous periods, when corruption became deeply entrenched and widespread in the political system. If it is to help strengthen the rule of law and build effective institutions, the Supreme Authority should therefore continue along this course, particularly by taking the following measures:

- Strengthening the independence and effectiveness of the Supreme Authority to enable it to exercise its oversight and verification powers more effectively.
- Establish a legal mechanism for monitoring the implementation of recommendations and orders issued by the Supreme Authority under Article 9, including legally prescribed deadlines and follow-up procedures.
- Require the relevant bodies to submit regular reports on the implementation of recommendations and orders, making accountability enforceable rather than merely an oversight procedure.

- Set up a system to track files referred to the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Court of Accounts, to enable the outcomes of investigations conducted under Article 5 to be monitored.
- Strengthen the specialised body responsible for administrative and financial investigations into illicit enrichment by providing it with personnel who possess legal, financial and technical expertise.
- Ensure effective protection for whistleblowers, thereby enabling the reporting of corruption without fear of retaliation or other adverse consequences.
- Publish detailed periodic reports on the activities of the Supreme Authority, including the outcomes of monitoring the implementation of recommendations and the results of investigations, to further strengthen transparency.

References in Arabic

General books

- Sami Mohamed Al-Toukhi: Administration through Transparency: A Path towards Development and Administrative Reform, from Secrecy, Poor Performance, and Corruption to Transparency, Flexibility, and the Development of Human and Institutional Performance: A Comparative Study. Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, Cairo, 2006.
- Afandi, Atiya Hussein. Public Administration: A Theoretical Framework, Approaches to Development and Important Issues in Practice. Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, Cairo, 2002.
- Hilal Mohamed Abdel Ghani Hussein. Skills for Resisting and Confronting Corruption: Modern Trends in Combating Corruption. Performance and Development Centre, Cairo, 2007.

Doctoral Dissertations

- Boudraham, Linda. 'The Principle of Transparency in Algeria between the Requirements of Good Governance and the Limits of Administrative Secrecy'. PhD dissertation in law. Faculty of Law and Political Science, Abderrahmane Mira University, Béjaïa, 2022.
- Al-Subaie, Fares bin Alloush bin Badi. 'The Role of Transparency and Accountability in Reducing Administrative Corruption in Government Sectors'. PhD dissertation in philosophy, Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 2010.

Periodicals and Journals

- Ben Obeid, Siham. "The Specificity of the Role of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption in Combating Corruption from the Perspective of Law No. 22-08." Journal of Rights and Freedoms, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2023.
- Debbouche, Farid. "Guarantees for the Protection of Public Funds and the Fight against Corruption within the Framework of the 2020 Constitutional Amendment." Annals of the University of Algiers 1, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2023.
- Al-Sheikh, Ali. "Transparency in the Civil Service: The Experience of the Ministry of Administrative Development." In: The Fifth Jordanian Scientific Week: Developing Competitiveness in Jordan, Vol. 2, Royal Scientific Society, Amman, 1997
- Akouch, Fethi and Chouireb, Djilali: 'The Role of the Algerian Network "Narakom" in the Field of Prevention and the Fight Against Corruption'. Academic Journal of Legal and Political Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, Amar Telidji University of Laghouat, 2024.
- Waddah, Abdullah; Ahmed, Musleh; and Al-Dabashi, Mohammed Ali Hammoud. 'Approach to the Concept of Transparency and Information Availability'. Ibn Khaldoun Journal for Studies and Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2023.
- Farwana, Hazem; Aliwa, Kamel; and Farwana, Sharif. 'The Role of Transparency and Accountability in Reducing Financial Corruption in Industrial Companies in Gaza'. Journal of Advanced Economic Research, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2022.
- Fellag, Mohamed and Hadou, Samira Ahlam. 'The Role of Transparency and Accountability in Reducing Administrative Corruption: International Experiences'. Al-Riyada Journal of Business Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015.
- Kamel Mustafaoui and Ali Maazouz. [Article title], op. cit.
- Haltali, Ahmed. 'Law No. 22-08 establishing the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption: What Change and What Feasibility?' Journal of Legal Studies and Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2023.
- Official documents and reports:
- High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and the Fight against Corruption. Annual Report for 2023. Algeria, 2023.

B. References in Foreign Languages

1- Books And Edited Volumes

- Hood, Christopher, Transparency in Global Governance: The New Agenda?, in Christopher Hood and David Heald (eds.), Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
- Peters, Anne, Towards Transparency as a Global Norm, in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 530–550.

- Schedler, Andreas, “Conceptualizing Accountability”, in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1999.

2- Academic Journals

- Bovens, Mark, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework”, European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2007.
- Drici, Miloud, « La Haute Autorité de transparence, de prévention et de lutte contre la corruption à la lumière de la loi N°22-08 », Revue de Droit et des Sciences Politiques de l’Université de Khenchela, Vol. 09, N° 02, 2022.

3- International Reports and Online Documents

- Transparency International, Transparency International Principles for Governments, Berlin, 2009. www.transparency.org/en/the-organisation/our-foundations/principles
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), SSTC in Action: Countries share experiences and lessons from benchmarking Korea’s corruption prevention policies, Algeria, 9 May 2025. www.undp.org/policy-centre/seoul/news/sstc-action-countries-share-experiences-and-lessons-benchmarking-koreas-corruption-prevention-policies
- United Nations Human Rights Council, Visit to Algeria: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, A/HRC/58/53/Add.1, 2025. www.digitallibrary.un.org/record/4072728/files/A_HRC_58_53_Add.1-EN.pdf

Notes

[1] - Anne Peters, 'Towards Transparency as a Global Norm', in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters (eds.), Transparency in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 535.

[2] - Christopher Hood, 'Transparency in Global Governance: The New Agenda?' In Christopher Hood and David Heald (eds.), Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 14.

[3] - Ali Al-Sheikh, 'Transparency in the Civil Service: The Experience of the Ministry of Administrative Development', in The Fifth Jordanian Scientific Week: Developing Competitiveness in Jordan: Quality, Productivity, Transparency, Accountability', Vol. 2, Royal Scientific Society, Amman, 1997, p. 358.

[4] - Atiya Hussein Effendi, 'Public Administration: A Theoretical Framework, Approaches to Development and Important Issues in Practice', Cairo, 2002, p. 261.

[5] - Hazem Farawneh, Kamel Alayouba and Sharif Farawneh, 'The Role of Transparency and Accountability in Reducing Financial Corruption in Industrial Companies in Gaza', Advanced Economic Research Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2022, p. 182.

[6] - Hilal Mohamed Abdel Ghani Hussein, 'Skills for Resisting and Confronting Corruption: Modern Trends in Combating Corruption', Performance and Development Centre, Cairo, 2nd edition, 2007, p. 59.

[7] - Al-Toukhi, S. M., Management through Transparency: A Path to Development and Administrative Reform from Secrecy, Poor Performance and Corruption to Transparency and the Development of Human and Institutional Performance', Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, Cairo, 2006, p. 185. A Comparative Study', Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya, Cairo, 2006, p. 185.

[8] - Transparency International (2009), 'Transparency International Principles for Governments'. Retrieved from: https://www.transparency.org/en/the-organisation/our-foundations/principles.

[9] - Waddah Ahmed Musleh Abdullah and Mohamed Ali Hamoud Al-Dabashi, 'Approach to the Concept of Transparency and Access to Information', Ibn Khaldun Journal for Studies and Research, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2023, p. 122.

[10] - Hilal, M. A. G. Hussein, 'Skills for Resisting and Confronting Corruption: Modern Trends in Combating Corruption', op. cit., p. 63.

[11] - Fares Ben Allouch Ben Badi Al-Subaie, 'The Role of Transparency and Accountability in Reducing Administrative Corruption in Government Sectors', dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, 2010, p. 38.

[12] - Mark Bovens, 'Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework', European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2007, p. 450.

[13] - Andreas Schedler, 'Conceptualising Accountability', in Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 20.

[14] - Mohamed Fellague and Samira Ahlam Hadou, 'The Role of Transparency and Accountability in Reducing Administrative Corruption: International Experiences', Al-Riyada Journal of Business Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015, p. 15.

[15] - Linda Boudraham, 'The Principle of Transparency in Algeria between the Requirements of Good Governance and the Limits of Administrative Secrecy', PhD dissertation, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Abderrahmane Mira, Béjaïa, 2022, p. 25.

[16] - Linda Boudraham, 'The Principle of Transparency in Algeria between the Requirements of Good Governance and the Limits of Administrative Secrecy', op. cit., p. 26.

[17] - Farid Debbouche, 'Guarantees for the Protection of Public Funds and Combating Corruption within the Framework of the 2020 Constitutional Amendment', Annals of the University of Algiers, Vol. 1, No. 37, 2023, p. 118.

[18] - Debbouche, F., 'Guarantees for the Protection of Public Funds and Combating Corruption within the Framework of the 2020 Constitutional Amendment', Annals of the University of Algiers, Vol. 1, No. 37, 2023, p. 118.

[19] - Mohamed Fellague and Samira Ahlam Hadou, 'The Role of Transparency and Accountability in Reducing Administrative Corruption: International Experiences', op. cit., p. 17.

[20] - Ben Obeid, Siham. 'The Specific Nature of the Role of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and Combating Corruption in Fighting Corruption from the Perspective of Law No. 22-08'. Journal of Rights and Freedoms, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2023, p. 340.

[21] - Boudraham, L. (2023). The Principle of Transparency in Algeria between the Requirements of Good Governance and the Limits of Administrative Secrecy. In: M. Fellague & S. Ahlam (Eds.), The Role of Transparency and Accountability in Reducing Administrative Corruption: International Experiences. Journal of Rights and Freedoms, 11(1), pp. 222–223.

[22] - Drici, Miloud, 'La Haute Autorité de transparence, de prévention et de lutte contre la corruption à la lumière de la loi N°22-08', Revue de Droit et des Sciences Politiques de l'Université de Khenchela, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2022, pp. 1380–1381.

[23] - Miloud Drici, 'La Haute Autorité de transparence, de prévention et de lutte contre la corruption à la lumière de la loi n°22-08', 2022, p. 1380.

[24] - Akouch, F. and Chouirb, D., 'The Role of the Algerian Network "Narakom" in the Field of Preventing and Combating Corruption', Academic Journal of Legal and Political Research, Amar Telidji University, Laghouat, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2024, p. 748.

[25] - Kamel Mustafawi and Ali Maazouz, op. cit., p. 105.

[26] - United Nations Human Rights Council, 'Visit to Algeria: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, A/HRC/58/53/Add.1, 2025, para. 19, pp. 4–5. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4072728/files/A_HRC_58_53_Add.1-EN.pdf

[27] - Heltali, A. (2022). 'The Law Establishing the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and Combating Corruption No. 22-08: What Change and What Effectiveness?' Journal of Legal Studies and Research, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2023, p. 351.

[28] - Heltali Ahmed, 'The Law Establishing the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and Combating Corruption No. 22-08: What Change and What Effectiveness?", op. cit., p. 29.

[29] - Heltali Ahmed, 'The Law Establishing the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and Combating Corruption No. 22-08: What Change and What Effectiveness?", op. cit., p. 352.

[30] - United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'SSTC in Action: Countries Share Experiences and Lessons from Benchmarking Korea's Corruption Prevention Policies', 9 May 2025, Algeria. https://www.undp.org/policy-centre/seoul/news/sstc-action-countries-share-experiences-and-lessons-benchmarking-koreas-corruption-prevention-policies.

[31] - Ben Obeid Siham, 'The Specific Nature of the Role of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and Combating Corruption in Fighting Corruption from the Perspective of Law No. 22-08', op. cit., p. 348. Ben Obeid, Siham. 'The specific nature of the role of the High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and Combating Corruption in fighting corruption from the perspective of Law No. 22-08'. Op. cit., p. 348.

[32] - High Authority for Transparency, Prevention and Combating Corruption, Annual Report for 2023, pp. 149–150. LIVRE RAPPORT-01-2023-INTERACTIF-kabhakimdz-PDF.

[33] - Heltali Ahmed, op. cit., p. 358.